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L38VCOTT
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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
     SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     JOHN COTTAM,
                   Plaintiff,
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                                          16 CV 4584 (LGS)
               v.
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     6D GLOBAL TECHNOLOGIES, INC.,
     6D ACQUISITIONS, INC.,
7
                   Defendants.
                                    REMOTE BENCH TRIAL
8
                                          (Via Zoom)
       -----x
9
                                           New York, N.Y.
                                           March 8, 2021
10
                                           10:30 a.m.
     Before:
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                       HON. LORNA G. SCHOFIELD,
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                                           District Judge
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                             APPEARANCES
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     JOHN COTTAM, pro se
16
     CATAFAGO FINI
         Attorneys for Defendants
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     BY: TOM M. FINI
          ADAM B. SHERMAN
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               (Remote proceeding via Zoom)
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               THE COURT: Good morning.
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               MR. FINI: Good morning.
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               MR. COTTAM: Good morning, your Honor.
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               (Case called)
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               THE DEPUTY CLERK: Before we begin, I'd like to remind
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      the parties and anyone else listening that recording or
      rebroadcasting of this proceeding is prohibited. Violation of
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      this prohibition may result in sanctions.
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               We're here before the Honorable Lorna G. Schofield.
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               THE COURT: So here we are again at long last, our
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      trial. Welcome, everyone.
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               Let me just start by preadmitting exhibits; we
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      discussed them at our final pretrial conference.
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               So I'm admitting Joint Exhibits 1 through 5, and 8
      through 16. I'm admitting Plaintiff's Exhibits 1 through 10,
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      13 to 22, 24 to 27, and Defendants' Exhibits 1 through 11.
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               (Joint Exhibits 1-5 and 8-16 received in evidence)
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               (Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-10, 13-22, 24-27 received in
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      evidence)
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               (Defendant's Exhibits 1-11 received in evidence)
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               THE COURT: I also want to remind the parties of the
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      time limits that I set at the final pretrial conference, and
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      that is half an hour for any cross, half an hour for redirect,
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      except as to the plaintiff, Dr. Cottam; we agreed that we would
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L38VCOTT Cottam - cross

not have redirect, but that he would be free to explain his answers on cross; and that if he did so at any length, then I would give the defendants some additional time on cross.

We also discussed ten minutes per side for summations, plus any additional time that I need to ask questions.

So I think we all know each other, except I have not met Mr. Hinton, who I understand is the expert for defendants. Since he's an expert and not a fact witness, I'll permit him to sit in on the testimony of plaintiff. And we'll begin now with plaintiff's case.

So also just to remind everybody, I, of course, have your direct testimony in writing, which is what I requested.

So beginning with plaintiff's case means we'll begin with the cross of plaintiff.

JOHN COTTAM,

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called as a witness on his own behalf,

having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

CROSS-EXAMINATION

19 BY MR. FINI:

Q. Good morning, Dr. Cottam.

You understand that you are under oath; correct?

- A. Right.
- Q. Could you please explain for the Court your educational background.
- 25 A. I have an education in engineering science technology,

L38VCOTT Cottam - cross

1 | which was heavily math-oriented, which was a two-year diploma.

- 2 And then I finished an electrical engineering degree with a
- 3 computer minor, which was also heavily math-oriented. And then
- 4 | I did a master's degree in health systems, which was sort of
- 5 | like an MBA geared towards productivity in the health care
- 6 industry. Then I did an M.D., four-year degree at USF; and
- 7 | then I did a four-year dermatology residency in Tampa.
- 8 Q. Okay. So Dr. Cottam, you're a dermatologist; correct?
- 9 A. Right.
- 10 | Q. You're a medical doctor; correct?
- 11 A. Right.
- 12 | Q. Did you ever obtain a degree of any sort in economics?
- 13 | A. No.
- 14 | Q. Did you ever obtain a degree of any sort in finance?
- 15 | A. No.
- 16 | Q. Have you ever performed stock valuations in your career?
- 17 | A. No.
- 18 Q. Would you concede that you're not an expert at stock
- 19 | valuations?
- 20 A. Correct.
- 21 MR. FINI: Your Honor, since the facts regarding
- 22 | waiver are undisputed and in our proposed findings of fact and
- 23 conclusions of law, I have no further questions and I move
- 24 under the Federal Rules of Evidence to strike any layperson's
- 25 opinion that attempts to offer an expert opinion on the

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valuation of stock.

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THE COURT: Okay. I'll take that under advisement. I think I've expressed my views before, and I'm unlikely to grant that motion. But I'll take it under advisement and not rule now.

MR. FINI: Thank you.

THE COURT: So you're saying you have no further questions; is that right?

MR. FINI: That's right.

THE COURT: All right. So then let us move to the defense case. We have Mr. Hinton's testimony by declaration.

And so Dr. Cottam, you're free to cross him.

Oh, wait, Mr. Street. I'm sorry, Mr. Street has to swear him in first.

PAUL HINTON,

called as a witness by the Defendants,

having been duly sworn, testified as follows:

CROSS-EXAMINATION

BY MR. COTTAM:

Q. Okay. Good morning, sir.

Let's pull up your direct testimony declaration, page 4, last paragraph. I'd like to read it here.

It says: Any attempt --

THE COURT: Wait, wait. Can we wait just a minute?

I want to find out from Mr. Sherman how we're doing

this. Okay. Go ahead.

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Q. Any attempt to determine the effect on the value of 60 shares of the hypothetical unexpected increase in the number of shares would be a challenging expert assignment. My opening expert report included calculations showing how difficult this would be --

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to stop you just a second. Our poor court reporter is taking it down verbatim; so even though we can read it, she still has to take it down verbatim. So if you wouldn't mind telling us where on the page this is, and then speak slowly.

MR. COTTAM: It's on page 4, last paragraph.

THE COURT: All right. Okay.

And let me just ask the court reporter, did you get all that or do we need to start somewhere?

THE COURT REPORTER: I got it, your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. Great.

Go ahead, Dr. Cottam. Sorry to interrupt.

BY MR. COTTAM:

Q. He went on to say: The effects of which I found might not even be possible to reliably estimate, due to the particular and unique facts of this case.

So my question is you said here that possibly no expert would be able to reliably estimate the effects of the increase in shares; is that correct?

- 1 A. Yeah. I said it's a very challenging assignment.
 - Q. I just would like a yes-or-no answer please.
 - A. Okay.

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- Q. Okay. You are aware that in expert --
- 5 THE COURT: Wait, wait. We need the yes-or-no
- 6 answer. So what was the answer?
- 7 MR. COTTAM: He said yes.
 - THE COURT: Well, I'm going to ask him.
- 9 Did you say yes?
- MR. COTTAM: Oh, sorry.
- 11 A. Can you restate the question? You say it may be -- it may
- 12 | be -- it may not be possible to estimate a reliable answer to
- 13 | the question. That's -- that's what I think I wrote, and so I
- 14 stand by that.
- 15 | Q. Okay.
- MR. FINI: And your Honor, the expert in a case like
- 17 | this should be able to explain his answer.
- 18 THE COURT: Well, you get redirect for that.
- 19 MR. FINI: Okay.
- 20 BY MR. COTTAM:
- 21 | Q. Okay. You are aware that in expert testimony, reliability
- 22 | is one of the basic elements that must be met; correct?
- 23 A. I understand that, yes.
- 24 | Q. You are aware that in this --
- 25 A. It does vary though based on the --

1 (Indiscernible crosstalk)

Q. -- must be tested, right?

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THE COURT: Wait, wait.

So you have to let him finish his answer.

MR. COTTAM: Oh. I was asking a yes or no.

THE COURT: Well, okay. So if you want yes or no, you have to preface your question.

MR. COTTAM: Okay.

- Q. So I would like a yes or no if you're aware that in expert testimony, reliability is one of the basic elements that must be met; correct?
- 12 A. Yes. But how you -- how you meet it depends on --

13 MR. COTTAM: Your Honor, this is --

(Indiscernible crosstalk)

THE COURT: Okay. So here's what we'll do: If you can answer yes or no, you can answer it. If you can't, you can say, I can't answer yes or no. But if all you need to do is explain your answer, then your lawyer can take care of that on redirect. Okay?

THE WITNESS: Okay.

21 BY MR. COTTAM:

- Q. This is yes or no: You're aware that in scientific method, theories must be tested; correct?
- 24 | A. Yes.
 - Q. Yes or no: And if someone blocks any such analysis, since

1 this is a unique situation, as you say, to actually test any 2 such theory, we would need to go back in time; correct? 3 MR. FINI: Objection. 4 THE COURT: Sustained. 5 Wait, wait, wait. So just wait. 6 If there's an objection, you wait for me to rule. 7 And what's your objection? MR. FINI: Your Honor, Daubert, as applied to stock 8 9 cases, you don't need -- not all experts have the same level of 10 scientific peer review. As we know, there are certain fields 11 of study where these Daubert --THE COURT: 12 Okay. 13 MR. FINI: -- objections --14 THE COURT: Wait. I understand your objection. I'll allow the question, not -- for whatever it's 15 16 worth. Go ahead. 17 BY MR. COTTAM: 18 Q. And if someone brought any such analysis, since this is a unique situation, to actually test such a theory, we would need 19 20 to go back in time; correct? 21 MR. FINI: Objection. 22 Α. No. 23 THE COURT: Overruled. 24 Mr. Hinton, when your lawyer objects, wait for me to

rule on the objection. If I sustain the objection, don't

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1 answer the question. If I overrule it, then you should answer. 2 Okay? 3 THE WITNESS: Yes. Thank you, your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Sure. 5

BY MR. COTTAM:

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This is a yes or no: And so we cannot test any Okav. expert theory in this case, including your own, if we can't go back in time; correct?

MR. FINI: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

You don't have to answer that.

Go ahead.

MR. COTTAM: Okay.

Q. In the scientific method -- this is a yes or no -- if we can't test a theory, there is no way to come up with an estimate of the error rate of that theory; is that correct?

MR. FINI: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

That means you answer, Paul, when you're MR. FINI: ready.

A. Yes.

Q. Yes or no: And when we can't get any analysis on error rate, we cannot even quantify any reliability; is that correct? THE COURT: Go ahead.

Α. Yes.

MR. COTTAM: Your Honor, this is taking a long time, and I've got a lot of questions to go through. Could we somehow either delay the time or get these answers quicker please? These are yes or nos.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don't we just say this: I take it you want a yes or no answer for all your questions; is that right?

MR. COTTAM: Unless otherwise stated, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's assume that. You don't have to say that every time. But, you know, cross-examination is not you're just reading a bunch of questions as fast as you can. So he's entitled to listen to your question and then answer yes or no. If he can't, he can say I can't answer yes or no.

So go ahead. You may need to revamp your questions and skip a few, I don't know.

MR. COTTAM: Okay.

BY MR. COTTAM:

Q. Sir, did you perform an analysis with all of the calculations you needed to?

MR. FINI: Objection.

THE COURT: Sustained.

I'm not sure there is an analysis in his declaration.

MR. COTTAM: Okay. Well, his declaration includes his attachment of his actual damages report.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

I'm not sure it's really relevant, but you can certainly ask.

MR. COTTAM: Okay.

BY MR. COTTAM:

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Q. Did you perform an analysis with all of the calculations you needed to?

THE COURT: You may answer.

- A. Sorry, I don't understand the question. I obviously submitted an analysis.
- MR. COTTAM: Your Honor, this is a yes-or-no --
- 12 A. -- limited in scope --
- 13 | THE COURT: Wait. Just wait.
 - He said he didn't understand the question. Now he's trying to tell you why he didn't understand the question.
- MR. COTTAM: Well, I could repeat --
- THE COURT: Well, he didn't understand it; it's not that he didn't hear it.
- A. I think my expert report stands for itself, right. There's an analysis in there; it has a limited scope. And I think I
- 21 delineated the scope. I had the information I needed to
- 22 conduct the analysis that I did in that report within the scope
- 23 | that's defined.
- Q. Okay. Yes or no, did you present a complete report to this
- 25 | federal court?

- 1 A. What do you mean by "complete"?
 - Q. Well, what you define as complete.

MR. FINI: Objection.

THE COURT: Well, okay. So did you say what you thought you needed to say in your report? I'm going to rephrase the question just so it's understandable to me.

Mr. Hinton?

THE WITNESS: Well, Judge, one of the issues is there was a subsequent -- I never got a chance to respond to plaintiff's March declaration. And there was a change in the approach that plaintiff is taking in terms of the valuation and damages issues. And so I wasn't able to complete my articulation of my opinions with regard to that change in methodology.

THE COURT: Okay.

BY MR. COTTAM:

- Q. Sir, were you hired to simply say there were no damages?

 MR. FINI: Objection.
- 19 A. No.

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20 THE COURT: Overruled.

- Q. So if I tried to sell my shares in a few weeks, it would definitely depress the price; correct?
- 23 THE COURT: Wait. I need some clarification.
- If you tried to sell your shares of what?

MR. COTTAM: Of my 6D stock.

- 1 THE COURT: Okay.
- 2 A. It depends.
- 3 Q. Okay. Do you have any proof whatsoever that I would
- 4 attempt to sell my shares in a few days or weeks?
- 5 | A. No.
- 6 Q. So you're speculating then; correct?
- 7 | A. No.
- 8 | Q. And you have no absolute proof that it would drop the price
- 9 precipitously, do you, if I did sell my shares?
- 10 A. It depends.
- 11 | Q. So you're speculating on that as well; correct?
- 12 | A. No.
- 13 | Q. Are you aware that 6D bragged about their potential growth
- 14 | and their listing on the supposedly prestigious Russell
- 15 | indexes?
- MR. FINI: Objection.
- 17 THE COURT: Overruled.
- 18 A. I'm aware of their press releases.
- 19 Q. Okay. Do you know investors weren't -- do you know if
- 20 | investors weren't planning on holding their stock for years?
- 21 | A. Which investors?
- 22 Q. Any of them.
- 23 A. I haven't studied that question.
- 24 | Q. So you could have made assumptions that are wrong; is that
- 25 | correct?

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- Hinton cross
- 1 Α. I didn't make an assumption about that.
 - Let's take a look at page 6 under number 13. Q.

3 THE COURT: Wait, wait. Page 6 of what?

MR. COTTAM: On the same document we're on.

Okay. Thank you. Paragraph 13.

Thank you.

MR. COTTAM: Yes, number 13.

- It says: Cleantech, the name of 6D, was notified by NASDAQ that it would be delisted. Thus, any analysis of stock value would also need to account for the risk of potential delisting.
- My question is, yes or no, are you aware of any specific delisting warnings of 6D that 6D got, not CTEK, from the NASDAQ after the merger?
- 14 Α. No.
- 15 Q. Question, yes or no: Are you aware that 6D and CTEK were completely different companies? 16
- 17 A. Yes.
- 18 Are you aware their value and operations were completely
- different? 19
- 20 Α. Yes.
- 21 Were you under the impression that CTEK was merging with 6D
- 22 in a normal merger?
- 23 What do you mean by "normal"?
- 24 Ο. Like not a reverse merger.
- 25 What's a reverse merger? Α.

1 | Q. Well, you're an expert; you should know.

Do you know that 6D has no relation whatsoever to CTEK's operations?

A. Yes.

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Q. So let's go to page 6 under 12. It says here:

My expert report included some of this analysis to illustrate the tremendous challenges in trying to value 6D stock under these unique set of facts. But I did not provide a complete analysis of damages, as I understood that was plaintiff's burden.

So my question here is, these tremendous challenges would, quote, require significant hypothetical analysis partly because of this situation being so unique; is that correct?

A. I don't know what you mean by "hypothetical analysis."

- Q. Well, you're doing an analysis that would be bringing a hypothesis for the actual result, so it's hypothetical.
 - THE COURT: What was the question again? Sorry.
- Q. The question is these tremendous challenges would require significant analysis requiring hypothetical issues partly because this situation was so unique; correct?
- A. I don't agree with that. Your concept of hypothetical is not well-defined.
- Q. Okay. Would your analysis, which isn't even complete in your own words, would be a onetime theory calculated just for these unique circumstances; correct?

1 A. No.

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- Q. There would be no way to test that analysis, would there?
- 3 | A. No.
- 4 | Q. If the only way to test it is to go back in time and put
- 5 those stocks in people's hands, then the analysis would be
- 6 hypothetical and, hence, purely speculative; correct?
- 7 | A. No.

8 THE COURT: Objection sustained.

This is argumentative. We don't need argument; just ask questions.

MR. COTTAM: All right.

- 12 | Q. Let's see here. Let's pull up your original declaration,
- 13 | Joint Exhibit 5. On page 13, under 29 of this original
- 14 declaration, it says: This adjustment preserved the 3.2
- 15 percent ownership share of 6DT due to the investors.
- 16 My question here is, are you aware of --
- 17 | THE COURT: Wait, wait. This is paragraph 29?
- MR. COTTAM: No, on page 13 under 29.
- 19 THE COURT: Page 13.
- 20 MR. COTTAM: Original declaration, not this one.
- Joint Exhibit 5.
- 22 THE COURT: So Joint Exhibit 5, I'm looking on the
- 23 | left, this is Joint Exhibit 5. Is his original declaration
- 24 attached to his testimony declaration?
- 25 MR. COTTAM: Yes.

THE COURT: You might find it there then.

But in the meantime, let's not waste time. You can read it slowly so I can understand it.

MR. COTTAM: Okay.

BY MR. COTTAM:

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Q. It says: This adjustment preserved the 3.2 percent ownership share of 6DT due to investors.

My question is, are you aware that this Court has deemed the one-to-one transfer promised as unambiguous, and that investors never obtained a percentage ownership?

- A. I'm aware of the judge's ruling.
- Q. Okay. Did you ever read the agreement?
- 13 A. Yes.
 - Q. Were you told what the language meant or did you make up your own mind as to the meaning when you read it?
 - A. It wasn't my job to interpret the agreement.

THE COURT: And moreover, the interpretation of the agreement is not at issue here. I've already found that the agreement was breached in that the subscription — in that the people who subscribed didn't get all the shares they were promised. Go ahead.

MR. COTTAM: All right.

Q. So let's go to page 9 and 10 under number 24. It says here: As a combined result of the offering share exchange, etc., it says that investors in the offering would first become

shareholders of Cleantech, and then as a result of the financing exchange shareholders in the publicly listed entity

So my question is, who told you that investors would first become shareholders in CTEK?

- A. I read the agreement.
- Q. You don't know then that that's incorrect?
- A. No.

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- Q. So if you read the agreement, sir, are you aware there's nothing in there that has the investors investing in CTEK?
- 11 MR. FINI: Objection, your Honor.
- This line of questioning is just not relevant to the issue.
- 14 THE COURT: That's true. But I'll let him go ahead.
- 15 Q. You said you read the agreement; correct?
- 16 | A. Yes.
- 17 Q. Are you aware that investors invested in a company called
- 18 | 6D Acquisitions?
- 19 A. Yes.
- Q. Are you aware that those shares were supposed to be
- 21 transferred into the post merger entity on a one-to-one basis?
- 22 A. I forget all the details of the transactions as we sit
- 23 here, but I did describe it in detail in my report.
- Q. Okay. So per your testimony, we are dealing with a unique
- 25 situation, like you've never seen such a situation before;

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2 MR. FINI: Objection.

3 THE COURT: Overruled.

- A. I mean, there are always unique characteristics --
- Q. Well, you said this is a unique --

THE COURT: Wait. Just wait. Wait.

When he's talking, just let him finish.

Finish your sentence, Mr. Hinton.

- A. Yes. But this is a uniquely challenging case. But the issues that have to be analyzed and that I analyzed are well understood. And it's well understood the impact that they can have on prices.
- Q. Okay. Have you ever seen any valid research on such a unique situation before?

MR. FINI: Objection.

THE COURT: Overruled.

A. There are lots of studies that deal with --

THE COURT: Go ahead.

19 There are lots of studies that deal with?

- A. There are lots of studies that deal with different aspects of lack of marketability. They don't always deal with all of the combination of issues that we have to deal with here in the same study, but that's why it requires expert analysis.
- Q. Okay. This is a yes-or-no question: Since it is a unique
- 25 situation, the challenges involved in reliably predicting the

- stock price may be almost impossible in your own words; is that correct?
- 3 A. It may be, yes. I wrote that. It may be.
- Q. Question, yes or no: And any analysis would not be able to be tested, since we cannot go back in time or create a parallel
- 6 universe; is that correct?
- 7 MR. FINI: Objection.
- 8 A. I disagree --
- 9 THE COURT: Overruled.
- 10 A. I disagree with that premise.
- 11 Q. Okay. Question: Have you presented any statistical
- 12 | analysis on the error rate on what analysis you did bring?
- 13 | A. I haven't --
- 14 Q. No. No or yes.
- MR. FINI: The witness gets to explain his answer, your Honor.
- 17 | Q. There's no explanation --
- THE COURT: Just -- so, Mr. Hinton, you can say no or

 yes or I can't answer that. And your lawyer can follow up if

 you have explaining that you want to do.
- A. What is the test statistic, Mr. Cottam, that you're asking me to report an error rate about?
- Q. In the scientific method when you're coming up with
 theories and you are an expert witness, you need to produce a
 statistical error rate on your analysis or your theory so that

we can understand what are the chances of your theory being correct or not. That's part of the whole situation and scientific method and Rule 702.

So my question again is, you presented no statistical analysis on the error rates of what analysis you did bring; is that correct?

- A. You're wrong. Your interpretation is wrong.
- Q. Okay.

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A. When you report a test -- when you report a test statistic, when you report an estimate, you are right, you are correct, you have to have a known rate of error. But there are many situations -- and this is one of them -- where the methodology that you bring does not involve developing a test statistic.

So in this case, there are many facts that you have to evaluate and weigh in order to assess --

- Q. So what I'm asking, sir --
- A. -- the impact.
- 18 Q. So a yes-or-no question.
- 19 | A. There isn't --
 - Q. This is a yes-or-no question.

(Indiscernible crosstalk)

MR. FINI: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Wait. Just wait. Everybody just please wait. Everybody is talking on top of everyone else, and the court reporter can't get it down, so we can't do that.

So Mr. Hinton, you've made your explanation. And what you've basically said is that the answer you're getting to this question is nonsense because it assumes something that isn't valid. But you still have to answer the question.

And the question was, was there any statistical analysis on the error rate for the analysis you did? And there's a yes-or-no answer to that question.

So, Mr. Hinton, if you could just answer it.

- A. Right. I didn't develop a test statistic, and so there is no error rate analysis.
- Q. All right. Thank you.

MR. FINI: But, your Honor, I just want to place an objection. If someone asks someone, Did you clean the helicopter blades on your car, there's a sense in which the answer is no. But you really should not force the witness to say no to that, since it really — there are no helicopter wings on the car. So to say —

THE COURT: That's a good point. I take your point.

But in this case --

MR. FINI: And the fact of the matter is that evaluating stocks uses factors that people in the --

THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait.

We don't need argument; we don't need lawyers' argument right now.

So Dr. Cottam, would you just please continue with

1 your questions.

MR. COTTAM: Okay.

BY MR. COTTAM:

Q. Let's pull up Joint Exhibit 4. And let's go to Appendix C on page 43. Under number one, quantifying the potential impact of trades on liquidation prices in an illiquid market. It reads under 7, 1.7: The impact of prices of selling the large additional volume of 60 shares is difficult to estimate because it depends on the demand for 6D shares and may be unknown if volumes exceed market depth.

It also says at number 8: The extent of demand for shares is difficult to estimate, not least because it is continually changing. This is another reason why it may not be possible to develop an estimate of the impact on prices on the immediate liquidation of large numbers of shares that is not speculative.

Number 9: We do not know the depth of the market for CTEK shares prior to the offering or 6D shares during the subsequent period. We do know the volume of shares traded. Making the assumption that the market depth was equal to the volume of shares traded on each day, the prevailing market price would provide for estimating the price at which additional shares could have been sold into the market on each

day. In reality, doubling the trading volume would be expected to depress prices as the sellers' offers were matched with less willing buyers in the market.

So my question here is, yes or no, in general, you stated here that if significantly more shares are sold from one day to the next, day-to-day, especially on a thinly traded stock, then the price of the stock will likely drop significantly; is that correct?

- A. It depends on the direction of the trades.
- Q. You're stating here that in reality, doubling the trading volume would be expected to depress prices as the seller offers were matched with less willing buyers. So you're generally stating here, again, that especially on a thinly traded stock, then the price of the stock will likely drop significantly if there were significantly more shares sold from one day to the
- A. Right. I'm talking about --
- 18 | Q. Yes or no?

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19 A. -- very specific --

next; is that correct?

- THE COURT: Wait. Just go ahead and give us the answer. Mr. Hinton, go ahead and answer.
- 22 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, Judge.
- THE COURT: No, it's fine.
- 24 A. It's not a general statement.
- 25 THE COURT: Dr. Cottam, what is this document? You

just said Appendix C on page 43, and I see we're at paragraph

What is the document?

MR. COTTAM: This is Joint Exhibit 4 in his original damages analysis.

THE COURT: So is this his expert report or --

MR. COTTAM: Yes.

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THE COURT: Okay. I just need you to identify it not only so you can find it, but so I understand what it is we're looking at.

MR. COTTAM: Okay. All right.

THE COURT: Okay. And I believe you have three minutes left.

MR. COTTAM: Oh, you're kidding me. Your Honor, this has taken a lot more. We've got to get through the most important part here.

THE COURT: Well, why don't you get to it right now.

MR. COTTAM: Okay. Well, we got to get going here.

Let's pull up Plaintiff's Exhibit 26, 6D trading history.

- Q. So let's take a look at the stock price on 6D on 6/25 to 6/26. Do you see a significant increase in shares sold on 6/26 to 6/25?
- 23 A. It's higher than the 6/29.
 - Q. There was an increase from over 229,000 to over two million shares sold; correct?

- 1 A. On that day, yes.
- 2 | Q. And the price held fairly constant, didn't it?
- 3 | A. Well, it went from 6.5 to 6.8.
- 4 | Q. Right. So can you take a look at the stock price on 8/24
- 5 | to 8/25. Do you see the price -- or the volume went up by a
- 6 | factor of 18 times to over three million shares, and the stock
- 7 | price actually almost tripled; do you see that?
- 8 A. I'm sorry, which date?
- 9 | 0. This is --
- 10 THE COURT: August 24.
- 11 Q. -- 8/24, 8/25.
- 12 A. Yes, the volume goes up and the price goes up.
- 13 Q. Yes. Let's take a look at 7/23 to 24. The volume
- 14 | increased by over three times, and the price went up, not down,
- 15 | a little bit; is that correct?
- 16 A. Yes, on that day.
- 17 | Q. Okay. So let's take a look at 7/28 to 7/29. The volume
- 18 went up 3.3 times; and the stock price went up, not down,
- 19 | again, by a little bit; correct?
- 20 | A. I'm sorry, you're moving a bit fast. Which day --
- 21 Q. 7/28 to 7/29.
- 22 A. Yes, I mean, these are --
- 23 Q. Okay. Let's take a look at 6/24 to 6/25.
- 24 THE COURT: Okay. So, Dr. Cottam, if your point is --
- 25 you don't have to find every single one. If your point is --

1 MR. COTTAM: -- the point, your Honor --(Indiscernible crosstalk) 2 3 THE COURT: And the document is in evidence. So you 4 don't have to get the witness to say every one of them. 5 MR. COTTAM: Yes, I understand. 6 But this is -- this is a point that there's 11 7 instances in an extremely short time that is exactly the opposite of Mr. Hinton's theory. 8 9 THE COURT: All right. So why don't we do this: 10 don't you just tell us the dates. Because the document is in 11 evidence; you don't have to ask the question. 12 So we've already got one, two, three, four of them. 13 Give us the rest. 14 MR. COTTAM: Okay. We've got 6/24 to 6/25. 15 THE COURT: Okay. Hang on. MR. COTTAM: That's 5.9 times the stock price drop by 16 17 less than two percent. We have 5/1 to 5/4. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. COTTAM: With a five times increase and a drop of 20 less than a half a percent. We have 5/5 to 5/6, with an 21 increased volume of 4.7 times, and the stock price drop by only 22 two percent. 23 We have 7/1 to 7/2, the volume increase by over two 24 times and the price went up by four percent. We have 7/2 to 25 7/6, the volume went up by 25 percent and the stock price went

1 up, not down, by 28 percent.

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We have 8/4 to 8/5, an almost 14 times increase in volume; and the stock price went up, not down, by 6.6 percent.

And then the last one is 9/4 to 9/8. The stock price went up by 27 percent when the volume increased by over 4.6 times.

So that's 11 instances in an extremely short time that is exactly the opposite of Mr. Hinton's general theory.

THE COURT: All right. So you don't need to argue that. And now you've made sure that those facts are clear to the Court. I understand.

MR. COTTAM: Okay. Thank you.

THE COURT: Do you want to ask one final question? Because your time is up.

MR. COTTAM: So, okay.

THE COURT: Or if not that's fine too.

BY MR. COTTAM:

- Q. My last question, I guess, would -- if we have a hypothetical, unproven, untestable theory that is inconsistent with real-world situations, then no reliable principles and methods could have even been applied; is that correct?
- A. I can't answer that.
- Q. Okay.

24 THE COURT: Okay.

We could have redirect now.

L38VCOTT Hinton - redirect

1 | REDIRECT EXAMINATION

BY MR. FINI:

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- 3 Q. Good morning, Mr. Hinton. I have some follow-up questions.
 - A. Good morning.
- Q. Mr. Hinton, are there established criteria and methods that
- 6 experts use in the field of valuing stock?
- 7 A. Absolutely. And in this particular circumstance, they are
- 8 particularly important because we're dealing with a situation
- 9 | where it's well-established that you can't rely on the market
- 10 price as the right measure of value. And this is an issue that
- 11 | many economists -- but also practitioners, because the SEC and
- 12 the IRS and in the case law have struggled with. And if you
- can't use the market price, what are you supposed to do?
- 14 And there's a well-established set of factors that
- 15 you're supposed to consider to weigh in the particular
- 16 circumstances how you -- how you should consider deviations
- 17 | from the market price.
- 18 Q. So, Mr. Hinton, although stock valuation may not be an
- 19 exact science or a scientific field per se, are there
- 20 | nevertheless established standards in literature as to what an
- 21 | expert should consider in arriving at a stock price?
- 22 | A. Yeah. Well, in this case, the SEC itself has recognized
- 23 | that there isn't an automatic procedure or methodological
- 24 | formula for coming up with a determination. Instead, they
- 25 recognize that this is more akin to an appraisal situation

where different factors have to be weighed in considering deviations for market price. And so those qualitative judgments require intensive analysis and should be based in available evidence. But they are not necessarily amenable to developing a test statistic for which there's a known rate of error.

- Q. Okay. And in offering your opinions in this case, have you considered the factors that experts in the field do consider in determining the value of stock?
- A. I have. The important factors here are also -- they're listed in economic literature, but they are also listed in the case law. It's well-known that the circumstances -- the types of factors you need to take account of are how the liquidity in the market, which means how thinly traded or how much trading volume there is relative to the amount at issue, the size of the blocks -- block trades, the size of the amount, the quantity of shares attempted to be sold, the financial condition of the company. Is it an already established company, is it mature, and does it have -- what's the extent of the risks to its operations, they have a known track record.

The particular situation here where you have restrictions on the stock that are -- in these case the prevent transfer under certain circumstances as a special case, and there may be other factors like certain shares may -- and transactions may result in some sort of control premium. So

Hinton - redirect

these are all factors that you have to take into account. Most studies will look at one aspect of this or another.

In our case we also have the issue of dilution. So it's rare that you'll be able to find one study that combines all of these issues together. So in general, your going to have to -- you're going to have to conduct analysis of each and weigh those factors when you come to a determination.

Q. Mr. Hinton, when you wrote your original expert report on March 14, 2018 --

MR. FINI: Adam, could you please bring up doc number 63, which is plaintiff's summary judgment — original summary judgment motion from August 11, 2017. Could you please bring that up.

Your Honor --

THE COURT: Wait. So just so I know, this is not in evidence?

MR. FINI: This is not an exhibit because I didn't know that -- I didn't know what Mr. Cottam's examination would be, but this is in response to one of his points.

THE COURT: Do you want to just -- I will admit it because it's already on the docket; but just so we can have it identified as an exhibit, what would be your next exhibit number? I could actually probably tell. So it would be Defendants' Exhibit 12.

MR. FINI: Yes.

Hinton - redirect 1 THE COURT: Do you want to offer it as Defendants' Exhibit 12? 2 3 MR. FINI: Yes. 4 THE COURT: Okay. All right. And I can take judicial 5 notice of it under the rules of evidence, so I will admit it. (Defendants' Exhibit 12 received in evidence) 6 7 BY MR. FINI: So Mr. Hinton, we've marked as Defendants' Exhibit 12 the 8 9 plaintiff's summary judgment motion dated August 11, 2017. 10 When you wrote your expert report, did you consider the damage 11 theory that the plaintiff had offered in the case? 12 Yeah, I mean that was my charge at that time. 13 Ο. And --14 -- which is --Α. 15 MR. FINI: Adam --16 -- respond to it. Α. 17 MR. FINI: Adam, could you bring us to the 18 second-to-last page of this exhibit please, which is page 15. 19 Q. Mr. Hinton, if you look at the last paragraph on page 15, 20 one line from the bottom, it says: When the restriction 21 expired on March 30th, 2015, 6D Global was trading at 8.64 a 22 share. Is it correct that the plaintiff was measuring damages 23 by looking at what the price of the stock would have been six

It appeared that the plaintiff's theory was that you Yes.

months after the breach in March of 2015?

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should look at the time period after the restrictions were --1 might have been able to be lifted -- they didn't actually get 2 3 lifted in March -- but to look at the prices in the market after that time and use that to estimate what they could have 4 5 been sold for. And so that was the framing of my original 6 report, was to consider whether that -- how those numbers would 7 work out. Unfortunately, there's nothing here -- we didn't see a plaintiff's expert report, and so they are wrong obviously --8 9 THE COURT: I'm just --10 (Indiscernible crosstalk) 11 THE COURT: I'm going to interrupt for just a minute. 12 I'm sorry. But just in the interest of the brevity of time, 13 I've already determined that the price that has to be -- the 14 value of the shares that we're talking about has to be 15 determined as of the closing date. And could someone just confirm to me that that's September 29th, 2014? 16 17 MR. COTTAM: Yes, it is. 18 THE COURT: Okay. So we don't need to talk about 19 March. The plaintiff's theory is not about March now. And I 20 understand that your original report was aimed at a theory that 21

is no longer relevant, so we can move on.

MR. FINI: Okay. Adam, could you please bring up document 348, which is plaintiff's proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

THE COURT: So this is docket number 348.

L38VCOTT Hinton - redirect 1 MR. FINI: We'll make that -- what's the next exhibit, Adam? 2 3 MR. SHERMAN: 13. 4 THE COURT: It's 13. 5 MR. FINI: Okay. BY MR. FINI: 6 7 Q. So Mr. Hinton, earlier in the case, before the plaintiff shifted his damage theory, he was arguing that the valuation is 8 9 the date that the restriction should have been lifted. 10 MR. FINI: Adam, could you turn to page --11 MR. COTTAM: Your Honor, I'd like to object at least 12 just to that characterization. I didn't really change my --13 MR. FINI: Your Honor --14 THE COURT: Okay. Wait, wait, wait. 15 Okay. You're right. Just -- let's just wait. 16 is argument. All he wants to do is tell me something that's in this document. So why don't you just point that out. 17 BY MR. FINI: 18 19 Q. Mr. Hinton, paragraph --20

MR. FINI: Adam, could you turn to page 41 of 50, if you go by the court docket number at the top.

THE COURT: Paragraph?

MR. FINI: And it's paragraph 232.

BY MR. FINI:

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Mr. Hinton, was plaintiff's paragraph 232 the first time

Hinton - redirect

- you had seen plaintiff attempt to value the stock as of the audit of the breach?
- $3 \parallel A$. It was.
- Q. And this document was submitted to the Court after your opening declaration; correct?
 - A. It was.

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- Q. Have you analyzed what the effect of the restriction and dilution would be as of the date of the breach in response to plaintiff's new argument?
 - A. Yes. I mean, I've been anticipating seeing something from plaintiffs for a long time. This was the first time I had an -- I saw something to respond to. And I disagree with it because it doesn't take account of all the factors that establish that you need to account that are unique in the situation. So just focusing --

THE COURT: Actually, if you could stop just a minute.

Your lawyer had asked you whether you had analyzed the

effect of, and then I missed the rest of it. But I would really like the answer to that question before you explain

anything. So could I get the question again please?

21 BY MR. FINI:

Q. After you received the plaintiff's theory of damages as of the date of the breach, did you analyze the effect of the restriction and dilution as of the date of the breach?

THE COURT: Wait.

1 Just have you analyzed the effect of the what? The effect of the restriction. 2 MR. FINI: 3 THE COURT: Yes. And? 4 MR. FINI: And the dilutive effect of additional 5 shares as of the date of the breach. 6 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 7 A. Yes. And in addition, the most important issue being the lack of the thinly traded -- the lack of liquidity and other 8 9 factors. 10 The two factors you list are not the only two that you 11 have to consider, according to the established procedures here. You have to take into account those other factors I listed 12 13 earlier. And those had been a part of factors that I had been 14 developing empirical evidence on and was anticipating an 15 opportunity earlier in the case actually to respond to some sort of theory from plaintiff. So yes, I did do that analysis 16 17 and I have my own views about that. 18 Q. What did you conclude? THE COURT: So I'll say it for you -- just wait. 19 I'm 20 going to say it for you, Dr. Cottam. 21 This is all new, as far as I know, unless it's something that is in the most recent declaration. And --22 23 MR. COTTAM: And it's not. 24 THE COURT: So -- pardon? It's not? No, no, just

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wait.

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And so I -- if it's new and it hasn't been disclosed before, I'm not prepared to accept it now. But I am curious, I'm not sure -- it depends what relationship it has to what he's already said. So you can answer it, but it is subject to an objection that I assume Dr. Cottam is making.

MR. COTTAM: Yes, definitely.

THE COURT: Okay. So you may answer it, but just understand, I'm not sure what weight, if any, I would give it. But I'm curious what your answer is.

BY MR. FINI:

- So, Mr. Hinton, I asked you what you concluded.
- I concluded -- well, firstly, that the 17 percent number that is stated here is not the right -- is wrong, a wrong way to think about the -- in fact, it's only one of the many factors. When you take into account the other factors, particularly the fragility of the company, the restrictions, the thinly traded nature of the shares, and the size of the block that we're talking about, that, to a reasonable degree of certainty, I would conclude that the intrinsic value of these restricted shares, if 2.9 million shares were to have been issued on that date, would have been in the penny stock range, by which I mean the only way you could find someone to acquire those shares at that time was -- would be for a few cents in -essentially treating it as a speculative bet, right, as you would with any penny stock investment. It's essentially a

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- 1 | lottery ticket investment, highly volatile and uncertain.
- 2 Q. And even in your original expert report and declarations,
- 3 did you explain why the plaintiff had not even reasonably
- 4 approximated his damages?
- 5 A. I did. And you know, here you see it again, right. I
- 6 mean, you can't just pick out one factor, which is the

to the next, 10,000 times more trading volume.

- 7 dilution, and ignore all the other effects. The trading volume
- 8 on this date was 309 shares.

What plaintiff is arguing is that 2.9 million shares could be valued at that price on that day. That's 10,000 times more shares. So even the examples that Mr. Cottam pointed to in the trading history after this date, you don't see, one day

I've always, from the beginning, identified this thinly traded issue of this stock as being a key issue. But there are the other issues as well, right. There's as soon as you put a restriction on a stock and you can't actually sell it, it means that you're exposed to the operational and market risk associated with the business operations of that company, because you're only going to be able to realize some return on your investment in the future.

And this is a highly speculative company with no track record. If you look at the financials of the company, the 10-Ks, its recent experience admittedly for Cleantech is that it made losses. So it doesn't have a track record. It's a

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microtech stock. These are all additional factors.

THE COURT: So could I ask a couple of questions? One is we've been assuming that \$8.30 was the market price on the relevant date, the closing date. And I just wanted to clarify, was that the mean between the highest and the lowest, or was that the closing price, or what was the 8.30, just out of curiosity?

THE WITNESS: I believe that's the closing price; it's the conventions report daily prices at the close. But this is -- this is a situation akin to what happened in -- I've looked at some of the case law, the Dabinowitz case, where, you know, a similar penny valuation was determined to be -- was found.

THE COURT: So could I ask you a question there? And again with the caveat that I'm not sure that I can really accept in an evidentiary sense a new opinion that hadn't been disclosed before.

But when you talk about it being -- having a value in the penny stock range and taking into factors all the ones that you've listed that I won't repeat, I take it you didn't say, Well, we're going to discount it by 30 percent for the restrictions, we're going to discount it by 25 percent because it's thinly traded, and so forth and so on. I gather this was more of an impressionistic valuation based on the impact these various factors together would have on the willingness of a

Hinton - redirect

buyer to engage in the transaction as opposed to some precise

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     price; is that right?
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               THE WITNESS: Well, it's right to some degree, but it
      starts from the literature on restricted stock discount. So I
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      wanted to start -- to give you an idea of how I got to that
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      opinion. As I pointed out, the restrictions, the effective
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      restrictions, it's just one factor that is in play here, right.
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      Even if you had an Apple stock that's traded with high degrees
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      of volume and is a very secure company and you issued
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      restricted stock, you're still going to have to issue that
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      stock at a discount. And there are economists who have studied
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      that. And one of the exhibits -- if you want to pull up the
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      Silber study, Adam, is an example of where economists tried to
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      look at those examples of restricted stock.
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               THE COURT: And where is this? Where is this in
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      evidence?
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               THE WITNESS: It's one of the exhibits.
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               MR. FINI: Adam, what is it, Defendant's 3? Which one
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      is it, Adam? Adam, are you there?
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               THE COURT: He's there, but he's on mute.
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               MR. FINI: Oh, Adam --
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               MR. SHERMAN: Here's Defendants' Exhibit 3.
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               MR. FINI: Is that the Silber article?
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               (Indiscernible crosstalk)
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                          It's Defendants' Exhibit 3.
               MR. FINI:
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THE COURT: Got it. Thank you.

THE WITNESS: So as a starting point, when I was thinking about, okay, so how are we going to value essentially the intrinsic value at the date of the breach, right, which is, I think, to understand what we're talking about, we know we can't sell the shares, right, so this is not -- you know, this is not using a hypothetical sale, you know, modeling, you know, what you could sell it for later on. It's basically saying, Well, what's the intrinsic value on that date. And it's essentially an option value, the option that you have once the restriction is lifted in the future to sell.

And because, you know, this is -- essentially, you're -- you have to think about all the factors that would affect the value of this option.

Now, one of the ways that economists have done this is they've said, Oh, okay. Well, when there are these big companies, and some of them issue restrictive stock at a discount, we can look at all these companies. And then we can start to look at how big these restricted stock discounts are.

And in this study, this is an example with this one firm, actually the data on this is from the '80s, but you'll see that --

THE COURT: Could I just interrupt you again? I recall your saying in your report or declaration, something you'd submitted in the past, that even though one

Hinton - redirect

could find these studies of well-established stocks and to do something about the effect of restriction there, that that's not necessarily transferable to a case like this, where the stock is very thinly traded and there are various other variables that will affect the valuation of the stock.

And so -- I mean, I understand that, so you don't -- and also I think one of the -
THE WITNESS: No, no. I think what I wanted you to get from this is that the range of values here go from, you

get from this is that the range of values here go from, you know -- the largest discount here, it's still not large enough to account for those other factors. So if you look in this study, they look --

MR. FINI: Mr. Hinton, is there a page you're pointing to?

THE WITNESS: Yeah. If you look at the next page you'll see there's a table at the top here. And you'll see on the top line, number one, percent discount, the average is 33.75, and the maximum is 84.

And so what I'm saying is this is just one issue, and it's really being measured for companies that are not the sort of fragile, thinly traded microtech companies. Generally speaking, the 69 companies in this study are more well-established publicly traded companies.

So the 84 percent, it's just a starting point.

Now you've got to say, Okay. If you're just dealing

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with the issue of there being a restriction, you get to 84 percent. Now we've got to think about these other things.

Now, being thinly traded, this is not just thinly traded, this is extraordinarily thinly traded on that day. If you look at the fact there was only 309 shares traded on that day, we're talking about a block of shares 10,000 times larger, like maybe three million.

So in my first report --

THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait.

Could I ask a question again? I mean, you've likened this to an option.

THE WITNESS: Yes.

THE COURT: And so isn't the question then the trading volume on some hypothetical future day judged as of September 29th and not the trading volume on that day?

THE WITNESS: Right. I think you're right to some extent. We're using — this goes to another issue, which is the — you're right that if you want to think about it from the point of view of the ultimate — ultimate ability to sell in the future, you would have to make some assumption about how much liquidity there's going to be in the future. But your best estimate of how much liquidity there is in the future is going to be what you know about liquidity today, right.

So what you really should be doing is saying, I shouldn't use -- it's hindsight to use any information in the

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Hinton - redirect

future; but yes, it's an expectational -- it's an expectational concept, yes. But so we're really looking at the liquidity on that day, not because we're saying we would have actually sold it on that day, but as a measure of what it would have, you know, been in the future.

THE COURT: Or you could look at it as the liquidity for the prior week or the prior month or -- and you could also look at how much fluctuation. I mean --

THE WITNESS: Right. That's right.

THE COURT: I think there are about five minutes left, so I don't want to hijack any more of your time.

THE WITNESS: So how much liquidity there is is measured relative to how big a trade you want to make, right. And what I'm pointing out here is it's 10,000 times bigger, right. So what that means is, you know, if you try to transact, you're either not going to be able to transact or you're going to be able — or it's going to have a huge effect on the price. That's just one way of looking at that problem.

When you look at the other factors as well that you're supposed to look at, so besides the trade, the thinness of the liquidity, the fact that there is no track record of the company, as soon as you have a restriction, you're essentially locked into the operational risk of this company. And one of the risks is, you know, it could be delisted. And if it becomes an OTC stock, that reduces and depresses liquidity even

Hinton - redirect

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So when I said it's a unique circumstance, what I meant was although each of these factors has been studied and is known to have an important impact, there aren't really any studies you can look at where they sort of said, What if you have all these combination of things all at the same time?

So I think that in my assessment, having looked at those different factors -- and I did study the liquidity in quite some detail in my first report -- you also do have to include the dilution effect. You put all those factors together, starting at 84, you're going to end up with a discount that's approaching 100 percent. It can't be exactly 100, because we know that an option always has some intrinsic value; there's always some chance that your lottery ticket is going to pay off. And so it can't be nothing.

But we have to remember in this case, plaintiff actually made money on the sale of their shares.

MR. COTTAM: Objection, your Honor.

THE WITNESS: And so even if we can say --

MR. COTTAM: Your Honor, I object. I don't think making money has anything to do --

THE COURT: Wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait, wait. You can't interrupt with that.

Go ahead. All we're trying to figure out is what the value of the shares was on September 29th.

1 THE WITNESS: Right.

And what I'm saying is if you start with the 84 percent, and then you take into account these other factors, you're going to be pushing the discount -- effective discount down approaching, you know, 100 percent. It can't be 100 percent; it has to be something. But -- because it's -- essentially you think of it as an option.

The problem here is that doesn't mean there's any damages necessarily, because there's an offset. The plaintiff actually made money when they sold the shares they actually received. And so whether or not that intrinsic value — this, sort of, option value — is larger in value than the amount that they actually made on an investment is speculative. It's not — we don't know whether there was actually any damage at all. And that actually distinguishes this case from some of the other case law, you know, as I've seen it.

BY MR. FINI:

Q. Mr. Hinton, could you just explain why the later sale of the stock with a profit of 70,000 is relevant? Could you just explain that a little bit more.

MR. COTTAM: Objection, your Honor.

I don't believe it's relevant to --

THE COURT: Overruled.

I want to hear what he has to say.

A. Well, two ways to think about it.

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Either you think about what actually happened and you pare it to a but-for world where Mr. Cottam got 2.9 million shares. And you have to compare what actually happened, which is, he sold his shares and he got the money, versus what would have happened. You can't separate those things out. That's one way to think about it.

The other way to think about it is if you want to think about the conjecture that Mr. Cottam is making, which is what should have happened is he should have got 2.9 million. If that had happened, then the true price -- the price would have been pushed down, and essentially the amount at which he acquired his original shares was inflated.

So either way, you can't just ignore what he actually received from this investment. You have to look at -- you know, I think the most coherent and simplest way of thinking about it is what happened in the actual world. You need a complete counterfactual that is realistic and looks at all the implications of that.

In the counterfactual, there's 2.9 million, potentially even more if the other investors were to have gotten the same treatment. And you look at what you would have gotten in that case, and you have to compare the two. And that's how you get damages.

If you made money in the actual world, he'd have to be claiming that he would have made more money, and that's not --

Hinton - redirect

THE COURT: Could I just ask a question? 1 You spend a lot of your time in one of the directions 2 3 talking about each of your four scenarios and the assumptions to be made. And it seemed to me -- well, it seemed to me that 4 5 you didn't like any of the assumptions. And I understand your 6 time is up, but if you'd just answer my last question. 7 But if you were picking one of the assumptions as the most logically coherent one, as I recall, one is that only Dr. 8 9 Cottam got the increased number of shares, one was that all of 10 the subscribers got the increased number of shares, one was that all of the shareholders got the increased number of 11 12 shares, and the other was that the stock splits just didn't 13 happen, which I don't get at all, but, anyway. 14 But in terms of which one seems most coherent to you or most probable or appropriate to use in your analysis, which 15 do you think is most appropriate and why? 16 17 THE WITNESS: Well, first of all, just before I answer your question directly, I would just say everything I've said 18 before in terms of the impact on the damage claim on the 2.9 19 20 doesn't depend on me making some determination about --21 THE COURT: I understand. 22 THE WITNESS: -- between the different scenarios. 23 THE COURT: I completely get that. 24 THE WITNESS: But obviously if it is my opinion -- and

I think I stated this in my first report, is that whatever

counterfactual you come up with, it should be realistic. You can't, sort of, change -- you know, change one, sort of, isolated fact and not look at the implications of that or the other relevant facts in the case under that counterfactual. It has to be a complete realistic counterfactual.

THE COURT: I get that.

None of them seem very realistic to me, because they didn't really happen. So which one do you think is the most

realistic?

THE WITNESS: Well, I think the least realistic one is the one where only Dr. Cottam gets 2.9 million, because he was one investor amongst 34 who all --

THE COURT: And I read your affidavit. I understand the why. So just tell me which one you would pick, if you can. Or say that I can't pick one.

THE WITNESS: Well, the thing is, Judge, it depends. It's combined issue of law and fact at this point. Because I think you already ruled, you know, that there's not a connection -- you don't see a connection between the merger agreement and the subscription agreement.

But if there is a connection between those two, and then suddenly you were to unexpectedly issue more shares to one, sort of -- one, sort of, subset of the shareholders, the other shareholders would object, right. And so you would have to take that into account.

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Now, if you have a counterfactual where you're saying, Well, that's not -- you don't see that -- there isn't a connection, you don't see that connection, then at least -then you would have to recognize that a realistic scenario would be to treat all the investors who are similarly situated and these are -- the same subscription agreement would be treated similarly.

Because otherwise, other subscribers, investors, would come forward and say -- and bring their own case and ask for additional shares. And basically, every time someone else came forward and sued for their, you know, appropriate treatment under that same contract, you'd get more shares being issued. And that would have pushed down the prices further from dilution and these other effects. And so, you know, it starts to make no sense.

THE COURT: Okay. I understand. And I also understand the problem with making those assumptions, as you point out in your --

MR. FINI: Your Honor, if I may. And I was very happy -- of course I wanted the witness to answer your questions. I just had one question, and could I just ask one final?

THE COURT: You can ask one final question, yes. BY MR. FINI:

Mr. Hinton, Dr. Cottam pointed to some days, many months

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after the date of the breach, where there was some higher trading volume. And he pointed to the prices on those days as somehow undermining your position.

Do you agree with the suggestion that he was making?

A. No, he -- his premise was all back -- was faulty, because I wasn't making a general statement, which is whenever there's more volume, the price goes down.

And if you read my -- the Appendix C to my original report, I cite -- you know, this is a really well-studied, you know, area of market microstructure.

The whole idea is I was talking about a directional trade. So when you're trying to dispose of -- you know, sell a large volume of shares into the market, more shares than the market has -- you know, can absorb easily, it starts to push down the prices. And that's well understood. You have to look at the direction of the trade.

And the question is then -- but if you look historically at any day, obviously in any day in the market, you can't look at the daily trading volume and say which direction those trades were being made in. It's nonsensical. It doesn't tell you anything. And there also may be other reasons why the prices went up and down on any particular day.

So that exercise really -- didn't really speak to the issue of what happens in a market -- and this is something that economists, including Maureen O'Hara, who I cite in my first

report, is an expert on market microstructure --

THE COURT: I'm just going to -- go ahead and finish your sentence.

(Indiscernible crosstalk)

THE WITNESS: Right. So how is it that prices are affected if you try to sell way, way more shares than have historically been sold in a market?

THE COURT: Okay. I'm going to stop you right there.

So before I close the evidence, I had one question for Dr. Cottam. So if you'll put your witness hat back on. And you're still under oath.

And I think I am correcting a typographical error, but you tell me. And it goes to the issue of waiver.

You said that you learned that you received 420,290 shares on March 14, 2014. But I think you mean March 14, 2015, given the chronology of events. But I just wanted you to confirm that.

MR. COTTAM: Yeah, it might be a typo. But, no, I learned somewhere around the time -- I can't remember, because it's a long time ago. But it's right around the time when the stocks were supposed to be cleared at around March -- or the end of March or April of 2015.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

All right. So if everybody is okay to continue, what I'd like to do now is hear the ten-minute arguments from each

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And I will hear from Dr. Cottam first, if you'd like to 1 side. 2 go first. 3 MR. COTTAM: Okay. 4 THE COURT: Or if you'd like to go last, I'll let you 5 go last. 6 MR. COTTAM: No, I'll go first. 7 THE COURT: Okay. 8 MR. COTTAM: First, I think it's important in this 9 case to summarize the background. 10 CTEK was a shell company with zero operations before 11 the agreement was even dated. And CTEK lied about this on their SEC documents, as did 6D, when they inherited this 12 13 status. Mr. Kang, who was also selling the stock to the 14 investors -- and UC Tech was a shell company and actually 15 required this, yet misrepresented CTEK in the agreements as a going concern. CTEK and 6D were controlled --16 17 THE COURT: So I'm going to -- can you just talk a 18 little bit more slowly, one, so I can understand you; and two, 19 so the court reporter could get it. 20 MR. COTTAM: Okay. 21 This merger was a reverse merger and was planned as 22 such and was hidden from investors. This was specifically lied 23 about in SEC documents to induce investment. 6D eventually

admitted the merger was a reverse merger, but still reported it

was not a shell company on SEC documents, when it was.

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6D told Radnor and hence the investors that the six-month restriction would end automatically March 29th, 2015. They then reneged on this, after reneging on the one-to-one transfer promise, changing the requirements for unrestriction three times. These requirements were called onerous and impossible and far beyond normal by Kibrik, Mr. Alexander Kibrik of Radnor.

6D forced investors against their will to hire lawyers and get language, put in letters to 6D in order to clear their stock after they were never informed of this and after 6D and 6D Acquisitions got their money.

Benjamin Wey was indicted in 2015, along with William Uchimoto, who was also Radnor's counsel. One of the companies in the indictment was CTEK. 6D was delisted per NASDAQ due to what the NASDAQ said were bald-faced assertions by Tejune Kang and his board related to Benjamin Wey's hidden involvement, transfer of unreported stock to Benjamin Wey associates at the time when my shares should have been clear, and other misrepresentations in the delisting hearings and other filing errors.

I believe defendants have an unsubstantiated claim that the relatively small addition of 17 percent in the number of shares would have completely destroyed the stock price beyond the relatively simple calculation that will reduce this price by 17 percent. They could only, in many of their

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situations, come up with these claims of impossibility of performance.

The effects of dilution are quite simple really. You just take the company, if it's worth \$1,000, if one share is outstanding, one share is worth 1,000. If ten shares are outstanding, each is worth \$100 if the company's value remains constant.

With respect to liquidity, there's actually zero evidence that the extra shares would decimate the stock price and there would be attempts at immediate sales. There would not be necessarily at all. Claiming any investor would try to sell their stock immediately is not true. The only reason investors would do this is because of the discovery of the entire scheme of material misrepresentations that I have documented in detail.

There was no other reason to believe that there would have needed to be an immediate liquidation of any shares, let alone millions of them. Stock prices cannot be predicted reliably by any mathematical analysis. An October 2009 study by New Zealand's Massey University tested more than 5,000 technical analysis strategies in 49 countries, showing that not one strategy generated returns that aren't predicted by chance.

Defendants' expert claims used improper data ranges for some analyses that are outside of when my stocks should have been cleared and after delisting, they are based on false

assumptions of share dumping and fly in the face of these actual historical prices in 6D during and after unusually high volumes of trading in periods in which my stock should have been able to be sold.

On one, just one, unusually high volume day of trading that we talked about, June 26th, 2,360,000 shares sold in just one day, and the price held quite constant, in fact, trading at about 33 percent higher within one week. On many other relatively large volume trading days and weeks, the price remained stable or even increased and, on August 25th, when over three million shares were sold in just one day, the stock price actually jumped over 177 percent, almost triple the price.

Defendants' expert methods are not able to be tested in the real world. I believe I have presented reproducible, stable, logical, and common sense estimates given these two scenarios that I have written up that are fitting with the law and real-world events, which is reasonable.

Any theory of the effect of liquidity is impossible to calculate and actually test. In fact, as Mr. Hinton explained, it may not be possible to develop an estimate of the impact on prices of the immediate liquidation of a large number of shares that is not speculative. Therefore, such theories cannot be assessed for reliability or validity or any statistical analysis, which is why he never brought a statistical analysis

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of the error rates of any of his analyses, which is required per Rule 702. In fact, in what is probably the most stunning admission in this case --THE COURT: Could I ask you a question about that? MR. COTTAM: Yes. Sorry. THE COURT: Are you saying that because it's difficult -- if not impossible -- to test the effect of liquidity, that it should be ignored then in the valuation process? MR. COTTAM: Well, I believe that that is something that simply cannot be tested. You have to be able to test scientific theories. When you're bringing theories to a court, you have to say, This is my theory. And this shows how it's been tested before. And unfortunately, in these situations when people breach contracts, we're left with imperfect situations. You always will be. But those imperfect situations should be resolved in favor of the one who is not in breach of the contract. And that's in the law too. THE COURT: So my question is, are you saying that the way to do that is to ignore the effect of liquidity on the valuation of your shares? MR. COTTAM: Well, what I'm saying, your Honor, see,

MR. COTTAM: Well, what I'm saying, your Honor, see, because I think that we should take a look at what the true trading history was. Because you have real-world events that you can see with 6D. And when you see the real-world events,

then you can say really what would have this situation, in terms of liquidity, been.

So let's take a look -- rather than all this hypothetical, I can come up with something hypothetical, he can come up with something hypothetical. Who wins? So let's take a look at a real-world situation on multiple times, multiple days, where incredibly increased numbers of shares were dumped on the market and the prices went up incredibly completely opposite of Mr. Hinton's stated theory that if these things from day-to-day increase by two times, there would be a decrease in the stock. So I think you look at the real-world analysis when it comes to this liquidity, because all you are left with is an argument by the way then.

THE COURT: So what are you saying in terms of the bottom-line number that you are suggesting? Are you taking that into account in deciding what the per share price is that I should use for the estimate of damages?

MR. COTTAM: Right. Because I think you're right, your Honor, I don't think it's something that you can -- you can come up with that isn't pure speculation and hypothetical. And so that becomes then something that's purely, you know, up to the Court to decide.

THE COURT: Okay. Sorry for interrupting. Go ahead.

MR. COTTAM: That's okay.

So I was going on.

Any theory of the effective liquidity is impossible to calculate and actually test. And then he explained this.

Therefore, such theories cannot be assessed for reliability and validity. Then, in fact, what is the most stunning admission,

Mr. Hinton claims the analysis required would be so monumental that he literally only provided an incomplete analysis.

So his analysis, by his own testimony, is hypothetical, unproven, can't be tested, there's no research for this unique situation, there's no statistical analysis on error rates of anything he's produced. It is purely speculative, therefore, and no reliable principles and methods that could even be applied can be brought here.

He's used incorrect assumptions. He reads clear language incorrectly in the agreement. His numbers are inconsistent with these real-world events, and he has an incomplete analysis.

So to me, it doesn't just fail *Daubert*, it fails *Frye* and it fails the entirety of Rule 702. They simply cannot overcome their burden.

This expert's main claim now is that I lose because I don't have an expert. And I cannot imagine a more disturbing perturbation of the expert witness function.

Given the above, what defendants are asking this Court to do is:

One, set new legal precedent that is, two, based on

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unproven math; that, three, cannot even be tested; and four, therefore, cannot produce any calculable error rate; five, is inconsistent with real-world trading events; six, makes assumptions that are easily argued against; seven, uses parameters that are impossible to foresee or control for; and eight, is based on assumptions that are not based on the true period in which plaintiff's stock should have become unrestricted; and nine, aim to allow defendants with egregious actions to escape the consequences of those actions.

So in contrast to defendants' position, my positions are stable, the numbers are easily calculable and repeatable and hypothetical -- and now not using unstable or untestable hypothetical analysis.

I believe I suffered damages. There was no waiver at all. And defendant shortchanged me of about two and-a-half million shares. They then did everything in their power to stop me from clearing what stock they did give me, while they got theirs sold. This trading pattern that you see in 6D is clear of what happened here. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

I'll hear from the defense.

MR. FINI: Thank you, your Honor.

And thank you for conducting this trial via Zoom during the pandemic. I really appreciate your public service.

Your Honor, this case involves an utter lack of proof

by the plaintiff as to even a reasonable approximation of his damage.

Up until his belated direct testimony affidavit, the plaintiff in multiple filings in this Court had a very clear theory of damage. The plaintiff, of course, has the initial burden to at least reasonably approximate his damage. And the plaintiff's theory was set forth, for example, in his original summary judgment motion before Judge Sullivan on August 11, 2017, doc 63. At page 15 of that brief, as we saw, he contended that the way you measure the effect of the restriction is to look at what the price was six months after the breach and what the stock was actually trading for. He again repeated that in the summary judgment briefs before your Honor on October 2nd, 2019.

Our expert did two things along the way: First, he explained in response to that why that number would be incorrect, even if you looked at the world after the breach. But our expert did more. He said that if you looked at the date of the breach and the trading volumes, that it would be very difficult, if not impossible — and when he used the word "speculative," he was talking about that the plaintiff, it would be very difficult for the plaintiff to establish the fact of damages, even the fact of any damage in this case, because by definition, when he sold his stock and made \$70,000, he sold it in a world where, by definition, there would have been 34

other investors who would have received 6.9 times the number of shares. That means that when he sold his stocks for \$940,000, even if you took plaintiff's simplistic view of the world that the only thing you do is discount that by 17 percent, because there would have been 17 percent more shares, that would be \$159,000. 17 percent of 940,000 is \$159,000.

There is not one piece of evidence that the plaintiff ever presented, no expert testimony whatsoever, contrary to the teaching in the Waxman decision, which held — at Southern District, held that you need an expert to explain what the effect of the restriction is. These are fact—intensive. The ranges can dramatically vary, could very well establish companies like Apple. Some experts had used a range from 25 to 45. And we saw Mr. Hinton today point to a study where discounts went up to, in that particular one, 84 percent.

The point is the plaintiff came into this Court and flagrantly did not present an expert. The plaintiff is truly testing the limit of what does it mean to have to at least reasonably approximate damages.

Now, the courts that have addressed that with restrictions were Waxman and in the Third Circuit -- Waxman cited a Third Circuit decision. And it was the Rochez Bros. v. Rhoades decision. And what those decisions clearly indicated was that if the plaintiff doesn't have any expert testimony at all, there's going to be a gap, a lack here, to allow the Court

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to at least feel that there's a stable foundation of damages.

So we turn to New York law, as applied by the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit has made clear that the wrongdoer rule is not a free pass; it's not a free pass to have no evidence. In Process America v. Cynergy Holdings, 839 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. Oct. 5, 2016) at page 141, the Second Circuit repeats well-established law that a plaintiff needs at least a stable foundation. The quote is: A plaintiff need only show a stable foundation for a reasonable estimate of the damages.

Now, that decision from 2016 clarifies when the Second Circuit in Bois, the Bois decision, it cites it. And in that decision, the district judge made a comment of negativity about the wrongdoer rule. And the Second Circuit did not approve of the negative comment that the lower court made.

But the decision in Process America and long-standing New York law in Second Circuit decisions, including W.L. Hailey, 388 F.2d 746, December 1967, the court at page 753 held: Plaintiff need only show the amount of his damages with reasonable certainty.

Now, those Second Circuit decisions in our proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, we have cited numerous Southern District cases which apply those principles, as the Second Circuit has made clear, have instructed as to the limits of the wrongdoer rule. And those decisions have made clear that the Court has to feel that there is at least a reasonable

Summation - Mr. Fini

approximation of damages here.

And in this case, we have a situation where the plaintiff flagrantly, intentionally — while he was represented by counsel — elected to put forth a theory of damages which was completely incorrect, did not in any way reasonably approximate damages, and was based solely on the idea that you look at the price of the stock when the restriction could first be lifted six months after the breach.

And for the first time, after having no expert, not asking for any expert discovery, not taking my expert's deposition, for the first time, after my expert put in his opening testimony declaration, only after that, for the first time, this case presents a very unique situation where the plaintiff came into court and then says for the first time that, Well, the way you measure it at the date of the breach is to just use a 17 percent discount.

But even that new theory doesn't even purport to address the issue of the restriction. That theory only purports to address if the other 34 investors are considered in the but-for world. And as our expert explained, if they aren't, then we would have an absurd situation where if the other — each of the individual plaintiffs brings individual actions, there will be more damages against the company than if the class sued in a class action of 34 investors.

Courts should imagine real-world, fair, but-for worlds

that avoid absurd results and windfalls. These were not sales of bicycles or a good. It was the sale of a stock in common under one subscription agreement, where the plaintiff knew that his bargain was he was buying in with other investors under that subscription agreement. And it would make no sense to ignore those other investors.

And now, for the first time that our expert had the opportunity to hear Dr. Cottam's theory of the value of the date of the breach, in this case we now have on the record our expert not only has explained why the plaintiff has not even reasonably approximated his damage, but our expert went further. He's explained that in this case, there's a perfect storm of factors that would dramatically depress the stock to the point where, in his words, Mr. Hinton testified that with a reasonable degree of certainty this would be a penny stock.

And he explained his rationale for that.

And any issue that your Honor -- I would like to have the opportunity for post-trial briefing, because your Honor did express some reservation as to whether you could hear that explanation. And the answer is, of course, yes. Because otherwise, plaintiffs would be able to play this game. You go into court, you do no reasonable approximation at all with no expert report. Then, after the deadline that the court establishes, the direct testimony, you submit an affidavit that blew that deadline. And then throw in your theory of how to

estimate damages. And then the expert for the defendant gets no chance to respond to that. The law cannot be that way. It cannot be a game where that the court is going to pluck a number out of thin air.

Dr. Cottam spent a lot of time on *Daubert*. And he ignores all the learning from the Second Circuit. *U.S. v. Litvak*, 808 F.3d 160 (2d. Cir. 2015), at page 180, the Second Circuit goes through the fact that there are all kinds of experts, not just scientific experts. And when you don't have scientific experts — and, Judge, you're no longer visible. I just wanted to make sure you can still hear me and you're still there.

THE COURT: I can hear you.

MR. FINI: Okay.

In the area of valuation, the Second Circuit has made clear that all sorts of experts get to opine on matters, as long as it's not just the expert's say-so; as long as there are at least learnings and methods, or at least benchmarks or factors that are developed in the industry.

And the Rhode Island federal court, in *Probate Court*v. Bank of America, 2010 Westlaw 1508922, the District of Rhode

Island explained that company valuation is fraught with

variability because it depends on so many hypothetical factors.

This indeterminacy does not mean that the practice is

inherently unreliable; rather, it merely reflects the fact that

accepted valuation techniques obligate an expert to make a variety of simplifications, assumptions, and estimates, based on reasoned judgment and professional training.

And your Honor is aware, given your long service on the court, oftentimes when you have valuation experts, they disagree. Reasonable experts can disagree. But in this case, we have a total vacuum on the plaintiff's side.

Now, the most interesting decision for your Honor to think about, of course -- and, of course, your scholarly tradition, you've already identified it in your summary judgment motion. It was the *Jamil* decision, J-A-M-I-L. And your Honor will think about that decision.

And what I would say to that, your Honor, is Jamil was an outlier case where the defendant flagrantly himself offered no expert testimony at all as to why -- as to what the effect would be. And the plaintiff absolutely had some damage, because he had a right to shares in that case, and there was some damage. And the lower court -- this went up to the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit pointed out that the lower court warned the defendants in that case. The Second Circuit decision is at 713 F. App'x --

THE COURT: I'm just going to -- I actually recently read the Second Circuit decision in Jamil. And it's a nonreported, nonprecedential decision. And as you know, Jamil is not binding on me either.

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MR. FINI: Right.

THE COURT: It's interesting. I obviously respect

Judge Rakoff. But there are many differences between that case
and this case.

MR. FINI: But then, your Honor, I did want to point out one thing.

THE COURT: Okay. But you're out of time.

MR. FINI: But I did want to point one thing out.

The Second Circuit in that case pointed out that Judge Rakoff even warned the parties when they both stipulated and threw up their hands and said no expert, he warned the defendants, I'm going to try to use the prices after the restriction to estimate what the effect would be. And they didn't make any objection. They didn't make any objection at all. They were warned.

In our case, we have the exact opposite. We warned all along to the plaintiff, You have no expert. You have no estimation of the damage and the effect of all of these factors at the date of the breach.

THE COURT: Thank you.

So let me address first the issue of post-trial briefing. I am not going to accept any post-trial briefing at this point. If I decide in the course of my writing my opinion that I need it, I will let you know. But I have the benefit of the transcript. I know what your position is on that.

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I hope I'll have the benefit of the transcript.

MR. COTTAM: Your Honor?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. COTTAM: You said you would give me two minutes to finish, to respond.

THE COURT: Absolutely. You can have two minutes.

I inadvertently gave you the full ten minutes, but you can have two minutes. Go ahead.

MR. COTTAM: Okay. I never blatantly avoided an expert at all. Again, I already explained to you why Judge Sullivan said the defendants' expert testimony will be limited to, etc., etc. This was a case where the judge was ready to rule sua sponte because of the blatant breach of contract.

Now, the only people who have been playing games here are Mr. Tejune Kang, Mr. Benjamin Wey, and Radnor, who were together in selling this scam. Per the *Trachtibal* case, one who breaches his contract should not be permitted entirely to escape liability because the amount of damages is uncertain. For the *Cynergy* case, where the nonbreaching party has proven the fact of damages, which I have, the burden of uncertainty of the amount of damages is upon the wrongdoer. Doubts are generally resolved against the party in breach. Certainly there are going to be doubts.

Per the Wakeman case, to plead a stable foundation, a plaintiff must show there are some facts upon which a jury

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could base a judgment. Not certain, nor strictly accurate, but sufficiently so for the administration of justice. This is one of those cases.

The number one issue in *Daubert* is is the theory testable. Actually, testing a theory any expert could come up with here would require getting in a time machine, which is why I said I'm not going to bring an expert here to bring perjury. And in addition, we'd have to get them stock in their hands, and then in a but-for world that didn't involve all of the misrepresentations of the defendants.

Defendants' own expert witness has said an analysis here requires hypothetical speculation by logic. This approach is simply untestable and fails — the first *Daubert* item cannot pass any of them.

Tejune Kang and Benjamin Wey brought this hidden reverse merger and shell company not to make any money on a legitimate company, but to use the NASDAQ as a vessel for their stock price manipulation. To induce investment, they had to hide the reverse merger and shell company status, among other things.

Over \$80 million of stock was sold before 6D delisted. And the public only had about \$6 million worth. And my just under a million dollars' worth that I sold gives us about \$7 million. So someone else sold over \$74 million worth of stock in that time. And the only other shareholders were Tejune Kang

and Benjamin Wey. They got away with their stock price manipulation scheme and, in the process, left possibly thousands of people with a complete loss.

I'm here fighting for them. I'm just hoping this case might at least help others in the future. Thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. Thank you.

So since you were both responsive to my questions during the course of the testimony and even during argument, I'm not sure that I have anything else to ask.

Let me just take a look at my notes here and be sure.

(Pause)

THE COURT: I don't have anything else.

If there's anything else that I need to know, I'll reach out to you. But I think with your submissions, as well as with the benefit of the testimony and argument, I feel like I know what I need to know.

So thank you very much.

Is there anything else we need to deal with here?

MR. FINI: Your Honor, I just wanted to say on behalf
of myself and my firm -- and I know Dr. Cottam feels the same
way -- thank you very much for conducting this. I look forward
to seeing you in person, when we all get the vaccine and we're
back in person. And I wish you and your family good health.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

I wish all of you good health. Thank you for your

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patience in conducting the trial this way. It's not the way we normally do things obviously. But I'm able -- I'm glad we were able to do it. I think it actually turned out to be very efficient. I'm glad that we didn't have to have Dr. Cottam travel up to New York. And I don't know where you are, Mr. Hinton, but I'm glad all of us were able to be where we are.

So I wish you all good health.

Thank you for your hard work and for your submissions.

MR. COTTAM: Thank you for your time, your Honor.

THE COURT: You're quite welcome.

MR. COTTAM: As Mr. Fini said, thank you.

THE COURT: Okay. You're welcome.

We're adjourned.

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